​

[2025] CEB 2

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE OF

THE MYEONG COMMONWEALTH

HIGH COURT

COURT OF EMPEROR'S BENCH

NO. 2 OF 2025

-----------------------

BETWEEN

​

                      POKELAND CHILD & GUY ENGINEERING AND CONSTRUCTION LIMITED        Claimant

    and

                            ZOHAR YI         Defendant

ZOHAR YI        Applicant

    and

                            IMPERATOR         Respondent

​

Before : The Rt Hon Lord Muk LC Ag LCJ in Court

Date of Hearing : 30 October Seongchi 3 (2025)

Date of Judgment : 20 December Seongchi 3 (2025)

-----------------------

J U D G M E N T

-----------------------

​

​

1. The claimant, Pokeland Child & Guy Engineering and Construction Limited, is the main contractor carrying out major renovation works at Lord Muk Garden in Gyeongsa. On 27 November Seongchi 2, the defendant, Mr Zohar Yi, an owner-occupier, formed the reasonable belief that the scaffolding netting erected by the claimant failed to meet statutory fire-resistance standards. In order to verify his suspicion, he cut a small section of the netting and set fire to it in a public area of the podium.

​

2. Security staff discovered the act. The management office reported the matter to the police. Mr Yi was arrested the following day and, on 27 December Seongchi 2, convicted at Gyeongsa Magistracy of one count of arson contrary to section 3 of the Crimes Act and fined 100 Myeong Won.

​

3. The claimant subsequently brought civil proceedings against Mr Yi claiming damages in the torts of conversion (for the taking and destruction of its chattel) and defamation (on the basis that the act of burning the netting imputed that the claimant had supplied dangerously substandard materials). Mr Yi was granted leave to appeal against his criminal conviction. Both the civil claim and the criminal appeal have been heard together before me.

​

4. I deal first with the civil claim.

​

5. As to conversion, the claimant plainly has title to the netting. Yet the ancient maxim ex turpi causa non oritur actio bars recovery. If the netting was, as Mr Yi reasonably believed and as subsequent independent testing has confirmed, of grossly inferior quality and highly flammable, the claimant was itself in flagrant breach of its duties under the Building Safety Act and the contract with the incorporated owners. A party cannot found an action in tort upon its own unlawful supply of dangerous materials. The claim in conversion therefore fails.

​

6. The claim in defamation fares no better. First, justification is made out in full: the netting was objectively and verifiably substandard. Truth is a complete defence. Secondly, and in the alternative, the act of drawing public attention to life-threatening defects in scaffolding erected around a residential block of several thousand souls was fair comment on a matter of the highest public importance. No reasonable jury, properly directed, could find otherwise. Both heads of the civil claim are dismissed with costs.

​

7. Turning to the criminal appeal, consistency of principle requires that the defence of lawful excuse extend to the criminal sphere in these circumstances. Where a citizen entertains an honest and reasonable belief that his life and the lives of his neighbours are placed in immediate danger by the wrongful act of another, and where resort to official channels would be impracticable or unduly delayed, a proportionate act of self-help confined to testing a small sample of the dangerous material does not constitute the actus reus of arson. The conviction was unsafe. It is quashed. The appellant is acquitted, the fine of 100 Myeong Won is to be repaid forthwith, and his name is to be cleared from the record.

​

8. One further matter requires comment. The estate continues to be styled 'Lord Muk Garden.' No consent from the Duchy of Yeongguk for the use of that title has been produced. Such usage is, prima facie, contrary to the Edict in Council on the Preservation of the Dignity of Imperial and Commonwealth Titles and Honours 2025. The incorporated owners are well advised to select another name without delay.

​

9. The appeal is allowed. The conviction is quashed. The civil claim is dismissed with costs.

​

​

                                                                                   Lord Muk

 Lord Chancellor and Acting Lord Chief Justice

 

​

[2025] PLR 1

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE OF

THE MYEONG COMMONWEALTH

HIGH COURT

COURT OF PROPRIETY

NO. 1 OF 2025

-----------------------

BETWEEN

​

                      STEFANO PAELLA        Applicant

    and

                            ACTING ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE COMMONWEALTH         Respondent

​

​

Before : The Rt Hon Lord Muk LC Ag LCJ in Court

Date of Hearing : 20 November Seongchi 3 (2025)

Date of Judgment : 8 December Seongchi 3 (2025)

-----------------------

J U D G M E N T

-----------------------

​

1. It is one of the strangest spectacles of our age that a man should march into court and demand that the state be compelled to call his private arrangements by the name of that ancient and public thing called marriage, as though one might compel the College of Heralds to recognise a cat as a coat-of-arms on the grounds that both have tails.

2. The applicant, with that touching confidence which mistakes novelty for justice, demands that this Court declare unconstitutional the plain words of Section 1 of the Marriage Act 2024, which defines marriage as the permanent union between one biological male and one biological female, ordained for the begetting of children, their rearing in virtue, their instruction in the Way, and the mutual solace of lawful conjugal love; and which, with a brutality almost refreshing in its honesty, forbids divorce altogether. He tells this Court that this offends Article II of the Constitution, which promises equality and human dignity to everyone under the jurisdiction of the Myeong Commonwealth. 

3. This Court, however, prefer to read that Constitution as honest men read any covenant: by the meaning it bore in the minds of those who swore it on the twelfth of August 2023, and in the light of the Doctrine of the Sages, which is older than any parliament and considerably less inclined to blush. The Book of Changes teaches: 'Heaven and Earth unite; the myriad things are born' (Hexagram 11, Great Peace). Marriage is nothing less than the human echo of that cosmic wedding. It is not a sentimental compact drawn up for the convenience of the contracting parties, nor a licence for pleasure issued by a bored magistrate, nor yet a plastic toy to be reshaped whenever the judges grow restless. It is, as the Book of Odes so poetically puts it, the peach tree in its youth, brilliant with flowers; it is the bride crossing the threshold to order well her chamber and her house; it is man and woman bound in reverent reciprocity so that the Way may be continued and the Lord on High not be mocked. To tamper with it is to invite something very like the wrath of Heaven, though modern men prefer to call the consequences 'social dysfunction.'

4. Sage Confucius himself (whom certain foreign courts have lately taken to quoting with all the accuracy of a drunkard reciting Homer) remarked that the man of exemplary character is reverent and does nothing amiss, observant of the rites, so that all within the Four Seas are his brethren. But brethren, mind you, not husbands. The Five Relationships begin at home, and the first of them is husband and wife; from this root springs filial piety, and from filial piety the state and the world community. The Constitution of the Commonwealth, with a becoming modesty rare in modern documents, still remembers this, and in Article II(18) sets its face towards the ancient virtue. Marriage, says Article I(9) with admirable terseness, is the voluntary formation of a permanent union of a man and a woman. Why? Because children must have ancestors and descendants in unbroken line (for the body, hair and skin are received from parents, and one dare not injure the gift); because they must be reared in rites and music; because the Way of the Sages must be handed on, or the heart-mind is lost amid the blur of indistinguishable desires. Sage Mencius was perfectly clear: the great business of learning is to seek the lost heart-mind. When the distinction between male and female is treated as a mere suggestion, the heart-mind is not merely lost; it is flung into the nearest ditch and bidden to fend for itself. 

5. The Book of Rites is blunter still: the rite of marriage is the root of kingly transformation. Pull up that root, and the tree of the commonwealth withers; the family falls into disorder, and (as the Great Learning patiently explains to those who have forgotten) when the family is not regulated, the state very soon follows it into the abyss.

6. This Court comes, therefore, with something between sorrow and fury, to the spectacle of the United States Supreme Court in Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015), a decision pressed upon us by the applicant as though it were not the fashion of one season in one republic. That distinguished bench informed the world that 'Confucius taught that marriage lies at the foundation of government.' A touching tribute, no doubt, but one which mistakes the Book of Rites for a sort of cosmopolitan etiquette manual from which the inconvenient specifics may be politely excised. The Sage was not discussing marriage in the abstract, any more than a carpenter discusses 'wood' without reference to oak or pine. He spoke of the union of man and woman, for the ordering of posterity and the harmony of Heaven. To wrench his words into a charter for quite another arrangement is not interpretation; it is sacrilege wearing the robes of scholarship. 

6. This Court is told that to reserve marriage to its ancient form is to violate equality. The complaint is paradoxical. True equality is not the equality of identical bricks but the glorious interplay of feminine and the masculine, each reverencing the other precisely because they are not the same. Every grown man and woman in the Commonwealth may walk up to the marriage gate tomorrow and find it swinging open with a welcome as wide as the sky. The only soul who cannot pass through is the one who insists on walking in the opposite direction and then complains that the doorway faces the wrong way. No man is barred from employment, housing, or the common decencies of life because his desires run athwart the order of nature; the Commonwealth is not in the business of hunting witches. Yet to demand that the Commonwealth pretend two quite different things are the same is to demand not equality but falsehood, and falsehood is the enemy of every dignity worth the name. The Framers of the Constitution, thank Heaven, still knew the difference between justice and jargon.

7. The applicant insists that to withhold the title 'marriage' from partnerships of his preferred pattern is to violate his freedom and his right to respect for private and family life. The confusion is monumental, and almost touching in its innocence. Private life, that wide and amiable territory where a man may read what he likes, love whom he likes, and quarrel with his friends over the proper way to brew tea, is left altogether unmolested in the Commonwealth. No constable breaks down doors to count the occupants of a bedroom; no magistrate inquires whether two gentlemen have drawn up a common household budget. Cohabitation, mutual care, lifelong devotion itself, all these are perfectly lawful, though the sages, who were never prudes but always realists, warn that acts outside the one channel appointed for them tend to erode the ethical soil in which self-cultivation grows. 

8. Marriage is a public thing, a corporate thing, a thing older than the state and more enduring, established primarily for the plain purpose of getting children begotten, reared, and taught to reverence Heaven and the virtuous. To insist that every private attachment must be granted the public honours of marriage is to demand that the Commonwealth put its seal upon a blank sheet and call it a charter. If every friendship is a marriage, then marriage is nothing; the word becomes a noise signifying less than the silence it replaces, rather as if the Legislature declared every tea-party a limited-liability company and wondered why commerce collapsed.

9. The applicant then advances, with the air of one who has discovered gunpowder, the argument that if only the Commonwealth would pronounce his arrangements matrimonial, the world would instantly grow kinder: fewer cruel words in the playground, fewer bruises in dark alleys, fewer young hearts driven to despair. It is a plea so generous in sentiment and so staggeringly mistaken in philosophy that one scarcely knows whether to laugh or to weep. Harmony, says the Analects, is not achieved by pulling down the ancient boundaries until every road is a muddle and every traveller lost, but by teaching men reverence, propriety, and the gentle art of minding their own business while wishing their neighbours well. To blur the distinction between the union that can found a family and the union that cannot is not to spread humaneness; it is to spread bewilderment. Vice and ignorance are the true parents of cruelty, and they are not exorcised by rewriting the ritual books but by the slow, patient cultivation of that humane reciprocity which treats every man as a brother without pretending he is a husband. To imagine that the only way to dry a child’s tears is to rewrite the laws of nature is to fall into a melancholy error: the error of believing that compassion is measured by the number of traditional distinctions we are prepared to sacrifice upon its altar. The sages knew better. They built a civilisation that could look upon the sorrows of the human heart without losing its nerve or its grammar.

10. Consequently, the challenge collapses like a house of cards built by a child who has never seen a real house. Section 1 of the Marriage Act 2024 stands four-square upon the Constitution, upon the rites, upon the Way itself. To alter it would be unconstitutional, unfilial to the ancestors, treason against the Lord on High, and an act of astonishing bad manners towards the future. Accordingly, the Applicant’s application must be dismissed and costs should be awarded to the Respondent.

11. Wherefore the application is dismissed, the Act upheld, and the Court adjourns in reverence to the sages and in fear of Heaven, which (contrary to rumour) has not yet abdicated.

                                                                                   Lord Muk

Lord Chancellor and Acting Lord Chief Justice 

 

[2025] CLR 1

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE OF

THE MYEONG COMMONWEALTH

HIGH COURT

COURT OF CHANCERY

NO. 1 OF 2025

-----------------------

ADVISORY OPINION AO 1/25

​REQUESTED BY THE PRIME MINISTER OF THE MYEONG COMMONWEALTH

​

Before : The Rt Hon Lord Muk LC Ag LCJ in Court

Date of Hearing : 31 August Seongchi 3 (2025)

Date of Judgment : 14 October Seongchi 3 (2025)

 

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J U D G M E N T

-----------------------

 

1. Let us start, as equity always must, not with the brittle skeletons of laws or old rulings, but with the raw pulse of a wrong that cries out for repair. Picture a simple, honest man who, on the solemn oath of a friend he trusted, pours every year of sweat and saving into a joint dream, only to watch that oath shatter on the rocks of greed, leaving him stripped bare while the betrayer sails off with the prize. Should equity stand frozen, chained by the stiff rules of courts, and murmur that nothing can be done? No, I say. The ancient truth still rings: equity will not let a wrong go unanswered. It is this very voice of conscience that now urges me to speak for the recognition, in our sublime Commonwealth, of remedial constructive trusts, those supple tools of justice, used not as a fixed collar but as a discerning hand to set right what conscience cannot abide.

2. Across the common-law world, macronational jurisdictions have long welcomed this remedy. In Australia, the trust springs up to strike down unconscionable gain, a blade against the plain unfairness that equity despises. Canada plants it in the soil of good conscience, demanding restitution when one grows rich by another’s unearned loss. New Zealand, with the steady furrow of reasonable expectation, sees to it that no one harvests where equity never sowed. Yet here in the Myeong Commonwealth, we linger in the dim shade where only institutional trusts push up like weeds in a neglected plot, giving little comfort to the promise-broken. Hints do glimmer, in proprietary estoppel, where courts have leaned to honour a reliance born of clear assurance. But why settle for half a loaf when full justice stands at the door?

3. Estoppel is the clear path I follow, a stream as bright as mountain water, yet as deep as our ancient fjords. I urge its adoption in this form: first, a plain and steadfast assurance from the promisor, spoken not in murmurs but in words that ring like a vow; second, a real and costly reliance by the promisee, made in the name of good faith; third, justice measured in the full light of all the facts, balanced on equity’s steady scales; and fourth, a remedy shaped by this Court to fit the hurt exactly, neither lavish nor stingy. This is no reckless plunge into whim, but a bridge built on solid doctrine: equity treats as done what ought to be done, and it honours the reasonable hopes of our kin across the seas. Policy favours it too: certainty for the trader, suppleness for the home, and a strong dyke against the wide tides of unjust enrichment or naked unfairness that could drown the careful.

4. Still, dark shapes gather in the tangle of insolvency, where voices warn that such trusts would choke the equal flow to creditors. To this I offer three guiding lights: a statute from our Assembly, weaving remedial trusts into the fabric beside the powers to undo fraud; a limit to assets that are clear and unburdened, equity’s own untouched by the creditor’s storm; and, for third parties who lend a knowing hand to wrong, the sharp bite of liability for dishonest aid. Let the bad-faith creditor quake, for equity has no mercy for the wolf in borrowed wool.

5. In the end, Myeong’s Chancery should welcome remedial constructive trusts upon this estoppel ground. It keeps faith with our equitable birthright, mends the tears in justice’s garment, and ensures that no broken promise shall mock the conscience of the realm. So let it be ordered, in mercy and in right.

So advised.

                                                                                   Lord Muk

Lord Chancellor and Acting Lord Chief Justice 

 

 

​

[2025] CEB 1

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE OF

THE MYEONG COMMONWEALTH

HIGH COURT

COURT OF EMPEROR’S BENCH

NO. 1 OF 2025

-----------------------

BETWEEN

 

                      IMPERATOR        Plaintiff

    and 

                            JANG MA-PI         Defendant

​

​

Before : The Rt Hon Lord Muk LC Ag LCJ in Court

Date of Hearing : 10 September Seongchi 3 (2025)

Date of Judgment : 18 September Seongchi 3 (2025)

 

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J U D G M E N T

-----------------------

 

1. The defendant, Jang Ma-pi, a self-styled legal scholar hailing from Yeongguk, finds himself charged with the offence of malicious defamation of a senior judicial officer, an act proscribed by Section 1 of the Edict in Council on the Prohibition of Malicious Defamation of Senior Judicial Officers 2025. The charge arises from an incident in July of Seongchi 2 (2024), when he published a written statement, falsely alleging that The Rt Hon Lord Muk (my good self), Lord Chancellor and the most senior judge of the Myeong Commonwealth, was deficient in the law of torts, capable, at best, of a modest 'C' grade in a university course, and insinuating that his Lordship was ill-equipped to adjudicate cases rooted in the common law of obligations. Furthermore, this Court must carefully consider whether this Edict aligns with Article II(7) of the Myeong Commonwealth Constitution, which safeguards the freedom of expression under Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ('ICCPR'), particularly given its restrictions on that freedom and its retrospective effect. A matter requiring our utmost scrutiny, indeed.

2. The facts, which are not in dispute, establish that the defendant published the statement with the intention or reckless disregard for its effect of undermining public confidence in the administration of justice. The statement is demonstrably false. This Court takes judicial notice of the fact that Lord Muk, as Lord Chancellor, is widely regarded by the legal community as a pre-eminent Senior Counsel and jurist, whose erudition in the law, including the common law of obligations, commands the utmost respect. The prosecution submits, and this Court accepts, that the defendant’s conduct constitutes malicious defamation under Section 1(3) of the Edict, being false, made with reckless disregard for its truth, and likely to erode public trust in the Commonwealth's most senior judge's legal expertise and capacity to perform his duties.

3. The defendant has raised concerns regarding my impartiality, citing my identity as the victim of this offence. Ordinarily, such an argument for recusal would carry weight, as the appearance of impartiality is fundamental to judicial proceedings. However, the unique circumstances of the Myeong Commonwealth compel a different course. As the sole confederal judge, my recusal would preclude the adjudication of this matter, denying the defendant’s constitutional right to access justice and gravely undermining the rule of law: I (ex parte Dinah) v The Supreme Patriarch of the Sagely See [2024] CEB 1, [9]. In these pressing circumstances, it is imperative that I preside to ensure the administration of justice prevails. Furthermore, I harbour no personal hostility towards the defendant, and thus no personal cause clouds my judgment.

4. The defendant has advanced no defence under Section 2 of the Edict, nor could he credibly do so. His statement cannot be construed as an expression of opinion protected by Article II of the Constitution of the Myeong Commonwealth, nor was it based on an honest belief in its truth. It was a scurrilous attack designed to impugn the integrity of the highest judicial office in this Commonwealth. This Court condemns the defendant’s actions in the strongest possible terms. Malicious defamation of a senior judicial officer, particularly one of the Lord Chancellor's unimpeachable standing, strikes at the heart of the rule of law, risking the erosion of public confidence in the judiciary, upon which the stability and order of this Commonwealth depend.

5. Turning to the consistency of the Edict with the ICCPR, the challenge centres on whether it imposes a legitimate, rational, and proportionate restriction on the freedom of expression under Article 19, and whether its retrospective application under Section 4 offends Article 15. Article 19(2) of the ICCPR guarantees the right to freedom of expression, but Article 19(3) permits restrictions prescribed by law and necessary to protect the rights or reputations of others, public order, or national security. The Edict, enacted pursuant to Article V(6) of the Constitution, creates an offence of malicious defamation of senior judicial officers with the intention or effect of undermining public confidence in the administration of justice. This Court is satisfied that the Edict meets the threefold test of legality, legitimacy, and proportionality for the lawful restriction of a constitutional right.

6. Legality: The Edict is a clear and precise law, duly promulgated by His Majesty in Council. Section 1 defines the offence with particularity, identifying malicious defamation as false or grossly misleading statements made with malicious intent or reckless disregard for truth, likely to erode public trust in senior judicial officers, as exhaustively listed in Section 1(2). Defences under Section 2 safeguard reasonable expressions of opinion and statements grounded in truth or honest belief, ensuring compliance with the requirement of being 'prescribed by law' under Article 19(3).

7. Legitimate Aim: The Edict pursues a legitimate aim in public morals, namely the protection of public confidence in the administration of justice. The judiciary, as the guardian of the rule of law, depends upon public trust to function effectively. Malicious defamation of senior judicial officers, such as the Lord Chancellor, risks undermining this trust by falsely impugning their impartiality, integrity, or legal expertise, thereby threatening public order and the rights of others. This aim falls squarely within the permissible grounds for restriction under Article 19(3).

8. Proportionality: The restriction is proportionate to its aim. The offence is narrowly tailored, applying only to false or grossly misleading statements made with malicious intent or reckless disregard, and likely to erode public trust. The defences under Section 2 ensure that legitimate criticism or honest opinion is not penalised, balancing freedom of expression with the need to protect judicial integrity. The penalties under Section 3: a fine of up to 250 Myeong Won on summary conviction, or exile for up to one year and a fine of up to 500 Myeong Won on indictment, are not excessive, reflecting the gravity of the offence while remaining proportionate.

9. Retrospective Application: The Edict’s retrospective effect, applying to conduct on or after 17 August Seongchi 1 (2023), the date of the Constitution’s adoption, is consistent with Article 15 of the ICCPR. While Article 15(1) prohibits retroactive criminal laws, Article 15(2) permits exceptions for acts criminal under general principles of law recognised by the community of nations at the time they were committed. Malicious defamation of judicial officers, by undermining the rule of law, has long been recognised as a serious wrong in common law jurisdictions, often addressed through contempt of court or analogous offences. The Edict codifies and clarifies an existing norm, and its limited retrospective application ensures a rational nexus to the constitutional framework of the Myeong Commonwealth.

10. The constitutional freedom of expression signifies the sacred liberty to speak in accordance with one’s conscience, free from coercion to betray deeply held moral convictions, and protects the right to advance ideas, foster debate, and express dissent. Crucially, no category of 'hate speech' exists as an exemption from this freedom in the law of this Commonwealth, for such an exception would empower the state to define and punish speech deemed hateful, risking attacks on the rights to dissent, criticise, and hold those in power accountable. Conscience is not a malleable or relativistic construct, subject to individual caprice; no rational conscience could condone the torture of infants for amusement or the murder of another for their political beliefs. Thus, error: those brazen distortions of truth that poison the well of justice, holds no rights in this sacred forum, for to grant it equal sanctuary would be to elevate falsehood above the unyielding light of reason, inviting chaos where clarity must reign. The freedom of expression is, therefore, not a licence to propagate malicious lies that undermine the fair administration of justice, nor does it extend to threats of violence, which are wholly unprotected.

11. The rule of law is the bedrock of the Myeong Commonwealth. It ensures that justice is administered impartially and in accordance with established principles, a tenet resonant with Confucian values of righteousness and kingly government. The judiciary, as the guardian of this principle, must be protected from baseless attacks that erode public trust and destabilise the delicate balance of a parliamentary democracy rooted in Confucian principles. The Edict serves this purpose by safeguarding the integrity of senior judicial officers, whose role is essential to maintaining the objective moral and legal order of the Commonwealth.

12. In conclusion, this Court finds the defendant guilty of malicious defamation under Section 1 of the Edict. Pursuant to Section 3(1)(b), and considering the egregious nature of the offence, the defendant is sentenced to exile for one year and a fine of 500 Myeong Won. Further, the Court declares the Edict consistent with the ICCPR, as it imposes a legitimate, rational, and proportionate restriction on the freedom of expression and its retrospective application is justified under general principles of law. The Edict represents a necessary safeguard to protect the administration of justice, ensuring that the judiciary can uphold the rule of law in the Myeong Commonwealth without fear of malicious attack.

So ordered.

                                                                                   Lord Muk

Lord Chancellor and Acting Lord Chief Justice 

 

 

​

[2024] CEB 1

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE OF

THE MYEONG COMMONWEALTH

HIGH COURT

COURT OF EMPEROR’S BENCH

NO. 1 OF 2024

-----------------------

BETWEEN

 

                      IMPERATOR (ex parte DINAH)        Applicant

    and 

                                 THE SUPREME PATRIARCH OF THE SAGELY SEE          Respondent

​

​

Before : The Rt Hon Lord Muk LC Ag LCJ in Court

Date of Hearing : 16 September Seongchi 2 (2024)

Date of Judgment : 20 September Seongchi 2 (2024)

 

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J U D G M E N T

-----------------------

 

1. The decision being challenged in this judicial review is that of the Supreme Patriarch of the Sagely See (the ‘Respondent’) to invoke his inherent power, shortly after his coronation on 11 February Seongchi 2 (2024), to prohibit Ms Dinah (the ‘Applicant’) from proselytising to all persons under the spiritual jurisdiction, and areas under the extra-territorial jurisdiction of the Myeong Commonwealth (the ‘Prohibition’).

 

2. According to the Respondent, the Prohibition was a lawful and appropriate response to the incident (the ‘Incident’) that took place on 5 December Seongchi 1 (2023), where the agreed facts are provided below:

 

The Incident

 

3. At or about 3 pm on 5 December Seongchi 1 (2023), the first meeting (the ‘Meeting’) of the College of Counselors of the Supreme Council for the Doctrine of the Sages (the ‘Supreme Council’) that was held in a meeting chamber under the Commonwealth’s extra-territorial jurisdiction at the material time. The Meeting attendees consisted of the Respondent and two senior clerics of the Supreme Council (hereinafter simplified as the ‘Supreme Counselors’).

 

4. During the Meeting, the Applicant, without invitation or permission from the Supreme Counselors, intruded into the meeting chamber and interrupted it, holding a copy of her version of the New Testament of the Holy Bible in one of her hands. The Supreme Counselors had no choice but to set aside their business and attend to the Applicant, who proceeded to proselytise her Protestant beliefs to them.

 

5. In the course of her interruption, the Applicant made the following claims about her Protestant belief, which include inter alia, the resolute denial of the institutional existence of the OHCAC (One, Holy, Catholic, and Apostolic Church), and the fact that the Holy Bible consists of more than 66 books.

 

6. The Supreme Counselors repeatedly asked the Applicant to leave. Finally, at around 4 p.m., she was evicted from the meeting chamber despite her reluctance.

 

7. After the Applicant’s eviction, the Meeting continued, where all three Supreme Counselors agreed that the disturbance was absolutely intolerable, and it was necessary to implement measures to prohibit the Applicant’s behaviour and prevent similar incidents in the future. The Meeting resolved to advise the future Supreme Patriarch to issue a Prohibition Order after taking office, which led to the aforesaid Prohibition.

 

The Arguments and Complaints

 

8. The Applicant contended on the grounds that the Prohibition was made in violation of (a) Article I(1) of the Constitution (‘The persecution of any lawful religion other than Confucianism shall be prohibited.’), and (b) her freedom of religion as recognised under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, which is protected under Article II(5) of the Constitution of the Commonwealth (collectively, ‘Articles’).

 

9. Furthermore,  amidst the ongoing legal proceedings, the Applicant has raised concerns regarding my impartiality in this matter, citing my identity as a Confucian cleric and my membership in the College of Counselors of the Supreme Council as an apparent conflict of interest, in reliance on Article VI(2) of the Constitution. While ordinarily, her argument for my recusal would hold merit, the unique circumstances we face demand a different course of action. As the only confederal judge in the Commonwealth, my recusal would completely deny the constitutional rights of the Applicant to access justice, thereby severely undermining the rule of law. In such pressing circumstances, it becomes imperative that the original judge preside over the case, notwithstanding any perceived partiality, to ensure that the administration of justice prevails.

 

10. And I must seize this occasion to underscore to the Applicant the solemnity with which I regard my judicial oath. The Oath for the Acting Lord Chief Justice mandates that I dispense justice to indigent and affluent alike in conformity with the Constitution, statutes, and customs of this most serene Commonwealth, uninfluenced by partiality or prejudice, affection or animosity.

 

11.  On the other hand, the Respondent argued that both Articles did not apply to this case: Article I(1) only covers ‘lawful religions,’ which patently excludes the Applicant’s denomination, which was not registered on the roll of lawful religions of the Commonwealth. And Article II(4) contains an express reservation from the rights ‘those that are incompatible with this Constitution’, and hence excludes the Applicant’s belief in a likewise fashion. Besides, the Respondent raises that decisions of the Supreme Patriarch of the Commonwealth is not susceptible to judicial review, an issue that I shall first deal with.

 

Amenability to Judicial Review

 

12. The Supreme Council, as established by Article III(9) of the Constitution of the Commonwealth (the ‘Constitution’), stands as the official governing body of the Confucian religion within our Commonwealth. It is the largest religious entity in the Myeong Commonwealth, with the Emperor serving as its Sovereign Governor. Through Article III(9) of the Constitution, the Supreme Council secures representation in the Commonwealth Assembly via non-voting clerics known as the Lords Spiritual, affording them a direct voice in legislative matters. Guided by its legal code of ritual law, the Supreme Council oversees clergy discipline and the practice of the five essential rites of Confucianism. This legal structure is duly recognised within the federal legal system, notably by the existence of the Tribunal of Propriety Law within the Supreme Court of Justice.

 

13. The historical lineage of the Supreme Patriarch as a public office performing a public function traces back to the ancient Ju Dynasty of continental East Asia, dating from 1046 to 256 BC. As a revered figure, the Supreme Patriarch oversaw imperial sacrifices and state ceremonies, gradually evolving into a trusted advisor to the monarch with considerable influence over court affairs. The contemporary manifestation of the Supreme Patriarch's office was enshrined by the Constitution and the Supreme Council for the Doctrine of the Sages Act 2024, affirming its enduring significance within our Commonwealth, the premier micronational inheritor of millennia of Confucian civilisation.

 

14. This esteemed Court stands as a steadfast guardian of our Constitution. It serves as a crucial check on any arbitrary or capricious action of public authorities. As delineated in Article I, the rule of law and constitutionalism are fundamental tenets of our Commonwealth, thus necessitating vigilant judicial scrutiny over the actions of all branches of government. While the Supreme Patriarch and the Supreme Council wield considerable influence, they are not exempt from judicial review. According to Article IX, this Court must assess the compatibility of legislative and executive actions with the Constitution, declaring any inconsistencies null and void. The constitutional jurisdiction of this Court is unequivocal. It has the authority to review the Prohibition issued by the Respondent, subject to further appeal in the Court of Appeals.

 

Article I(1)

 

15.  It is agreed among the parties that the scope of Article I(1) exclusively covers ‘lawful’ religions. The construction of what is ‘lawful’ is in dispute. Whether the Prohibition amounts to a ‘persecution’ for Article I(1) is not disputed. The text of Article I(1) is provided in the following:

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‘Confucianism shall be the soul of the Commonwealth. Subject to this Constitution, the doctrines of the Sages shall be made manifest in all laws and policies the Commonwealth adopts. The persecution of any lawful religion other than Confucianism shall be prohibited.’

 

16.  In this regard, the Applicant submitted that what is lawful must be construed broadly to include all generally recognised religions, including her version of the Protestant faith. A narrower construction that virtually excludes all religions other than Confucianism (the national religion) should not be followed, as it would render the succeeding words ‘other than Confucianism’ superfluous.

 

17.  The Respondent, on the contrary, submitted that Article I(1) aims to safeguard the Commonwealth as a Confucian confessional confederation. Therefore, it would be necessary for all unlawful religions to be suppressed publicly to make room for ‘the soul of the Commonwealth’. Nothing forbids citizens to practice unlawful religious beliefs and rituals privately. ‘Other religions’, under this construction, should be interpreted narrowly, encompassing only the form of Confucianism that was embodied in the teachings of the four of the greatest Sages of the Confucian tradition: Confucius, Mencius, Ju Hui, and Wang Yangmyeong (harmony be upon them). This would exclude various schools and forms of thought and practices that identify as ‘Confucian’ developed in the Manchu Daecheongguk, Japan, and Vietnam, as well as the ‘New Confucian Movement’ that emerged in latter half of the twentieth century, all of which are not strictly considered as ‘Confucianism’ per se to interpret the original meaning of the Constitution.

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18.  Whilst the Respondent’s understanding of the object of Article I(1) is accurate, it must be noted that the restriction of a fundamental right should not be presumed to be justified. Contrarily, the presumption of liberty, enshrined in Article II(8), a value essential to the administration of justice in the Commonwealth, demands that everybody be presumed free to act until the act is forbidden in accordance with the law.

 

19.  With the above being said, the other polar extreme is absurd. If every religion in the world, lawful or not, were permitted to proselytise in the Commonwealth, then Confucianism's constitutional value and status would be significantly reduced, defeating the purpose of Article I(1) itself. As raised by the Applicant, this broad construction is contrary to the most fundamental laws of logic, for a statute ought to be construed ut res magis valeat quam pereat.

 

20.  Before I commence further, I must emphasise the following. The ordained method of constitutional interpretation is the originalist approach. As stipulated in the unambiguous language of Article IX(1) of the Constitution: ‘Each interpreter of this Constitution shall interpret it justly to uphold its original intent and significance as understood at the time of its promulgation.’ The essence of the originalist approach is as follows. The text of the Constitution maintains a consistent meaning, reflective of its interpretation at the time of its promulgation on 17 August Seongchi 1 (2023). Absent a valid amendment, actions prohibited by the Constitution remain prohibited, and those permitted remain permissible, no matter how much time has passed since the promulgation of the Constitution. Secondly, the genuine meaning of the Constitution, rooted in its original intent, must be derived from (a) the explicit language of the text, viewed through the lens of (b) its constitutional purpose, as articulated in the immutable foundational principles enshrined in Article I, and (c) their historical context, elucidated in external documents crafted by the Constituent Assembly.

 

21.  The Constituent Assembly should be admired for its foresight. The originalist approach is an exclusive means to prevent constitutional interpreters, including this Court, from exploiting the Constitution for improper gain. Unless the Constitution's original meaning dictates the course of interpretation, what alternative interpretation could prevent constitutional interpreters, including the Justices of the Court of Appeals, from imposing their personal preferences upon the broader Commonwealth?

 

22.  Concretely put, in interpreting the meaning of part of a provision, the provision itself has to be read in an overall approach, with reference to the words before and after the part in question and the context of the provision. In addition to endorsing Confucianism as the official religion, Article I(1) also provides that ‘the doctrines of the Sages shall be made manifest in all laws and policies the Commonwealth adopts.’ This would mean that any threat to the Confucian spirit cannot and should not be tolerated under the Commonwealth’s laws and policies. This aligns with the widely known (judicial notice taken) original intent of the Constituent Assembly when adopting this provision.

 

23.  Viewed from a different perspective, it becomes imperative for the Commonwealth to uphold the essence of Confucianism through its legislation and policies. Consequently, if the Prohibition aligns with this objective, the Respondent would very probably possess lawful authority to issue such a directive. This principle is expressly articulated in the foundational Article I, which mandates that the ‘democracy and liberty and practices the rule of law and constitutionalism’ of our Commonwealth must be rooted in the ‘sagely doctrines’ of Confucianism.

 

24.  Within this framework, a suitable yardstick for assessing the legality of a religion under Article I(6) would be its compatibility with Confucianism. In this context, I posit that the concept of ‘lawful religions’ does not necessarily encompass the various schools of thought within the broader conception of Confucianism. For instance, Catholic Christianity, a lawful religion in our Commonwealth, has historically been deemed compatible with Confucianism since the 16th Century by Sage Matteo Ricci and Supreme Patriarch Sage Seo Gwang-gye (서광계), also known as ‘Paul Siu Koang-k'i,’ both esteemed figures within our Commonwealth and beyond. The determination of whether the Applicant’s beliefs harmonise with Confucianism or pose a threat to it falls outside the purview of this Court's legal authority. A more appropriate course of action for me is to defer this assessment to the expertise of the Supreme Patriarch, as per Article III(9), who heads a non-partisan expert body of Confucian scholars that advises the Emperor in his role as the Defender of the Way.

 

25.  In the Respondent's argument, it was asserted that the Applicant’s explicit rejection of an OHCAC ran counter to the sacred teachings of Paul Siu Koang-k'i (whose present-day successor is none other than the Respondent), which constitute a fundamental expression of the Confucian ethos of the Commonwealth. The Applicant’s outright denial of the institutional presence of an OHCAC conflicted with the principles espoused by Sage Paul Siu Koang-k'i, symbolic of the Confucian spirit and the prevailing understanding of Confucianism within our jurisdiction. I am content that assessing the compatibility of the Applicant’s beliefs with Confucianism was duly considered before the Respondent's issuance of the Prohibition Order.

 

26.  Hence, the Applicant’s argument must fail on ground (a). I shall now proceed to address the second ground of the challenge.

 

Article II(4)

 

27. The Applicant has advanced the contention that the right to religious freedom enshrined in the Constitution transcends the confines of what is deemed ‘lawful’ by the Supreme Council pursuant to Article I(6). She posits a broader protection ensured by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (‘UDHR’) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (‘ICCPR’) under Article II(4). Conversely, the Respondent relies on the caveat within Article II(4) that excludes religious practices ‘incompatible with this Constitution.’

 

28. The freedom of religion is an inherent entitlement of the individual to protection, within reasonable boundaries, from external coercion in matters of supernatural belief by governmental entities. This entitlement should be recognised in the legal framework of any civilised society, including ours, of course. However, the freedom of religion is not a carte blanche to embrace falsehood, nor a purported entitlement to deviate from objective truth. Error non habet ius. The Confucian nature of the Commonwealth entails a natural duty to safeguard the fundamental human rights to freedom from spiritual poison and a healthy conscience, both of which are crucial for exercising the right to know the Truth. The Supreme Council, while consistently refraining from coercing people to become Confucians, has acknowledged its obligation to hinder, to the extent feasible, the public practice and dissemination of erroneous cults, in the interests of the common good.

 

29. In my analysis, it is undisputed that the UDHR and ICCPR guarantee religious freedom. However, the same assurance is afforded under Article I(6), a provision specifically addressing the dissemination of diverse religious beliefs in this jurisdiction. Even absent the express reservation, the maxim of lex generalia specialibus non derogant cries out that, within Article I(6), the narrower proposition raised by the Respondent conflicts with and should take precedence over the general right guaranteed by the UDHR and ICCPR raised by the Applicant. Furthermore, it is noteworthy that the Commonwealth Assembly has formally ratified neither the UDHR nor the ICCPR.

 

30. Alternatively, even if Article I(6) is not considered, it is crucial to recognise that the right to religious freedom under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights is not absolute. Firstly, the UDHR, despite safeguarding this right, is globally acknowledged as a non-binding soft law, offering guidance but lacking legal force. This Court lacks jurisdiction to enforce soft laws, rendering reliance on the UDHR inconsequential for the Applicant’s case. Secondly, whilst Article 18 of the ICCPR protects religious freedom, paragraph 3 therein allows for limitations prescribed by law to safeguard public safety, order, health, morals, or the rights of others. Article I(6) provides a legitimate basis for a competent authority to impose necessary restrictions on religious freedom, especially in a Commonwealth where Confucianism is enshrined as the micronational ethos, embodying the public morals of the Commonwealth. The Respondent, as Supreme Patriarch of the Commonwealth and President of the Supreme Council, is duty-bound to uphold these morals by restricting the religious activities of a proselytiser in a justifiable, rational, proportionate, and balanced manner.

 

31. Having considered the respective effects of the UDHR and the ICCPR within the constitutional framework of the Commonwealth, I am convinced that the rationales elucidated in the preceding paragraphs effectively counter ground (b) raised by the Applicant.

 

Conclusion

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32.  Accordingly, the Applicant’s argument must fail. The Prohibition shall stand. I see no reason why costs should not be awarded in favour of the Respondent.

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                                                                                   Lord Muk

Lord Chancellor and Acting Lord Chief Justice